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"Academic Concerns"-Caring about
Conversation in Canadian Common Law

The Supreme Court of Canada, in its 2001 decision in Cooper v Hobart, refined
the test in Canadian common law for establishing a duty of care in the tort of
negligence. Although aware of the complexities and ongoing challenges of the
"duty of care" concept, the Supreme Court openly labelled these concerns as
"academic." This article confirms these concerns as "academic," but insists that
this label underlines their centrality not only to an understanding of the tort of
negligence but to the nature and form of common law reasoning. By pointing to
errors in the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment-errors of using the wrong
word, naming the wrong judge, confusing the structure of the duty of care
inquiry, and omitting an important precedent case-the authors identify failures
in the four principal activities of the common law: placing, naming, identifying,
and remembering. They suggest that the image, sounds, and fluctuation of
"conversation" capture the method of common law-its linking of past to future
through imperfect yet evocative analogical reasoning-and affirm the importance
of paying attention to the meaning of words, the names of judges, the structure of
questions, and the importance of history
La Cour suprdme du Canada, dans I'arrdt Cooper c Hobart prononc6 en 2001,
a raffin6 le critbre de la common law canadienne pour 6tablir une obligation de
diligence relativement 6 la responsabilit6 delictuelle et &la n6gligence. Quoique
bien au fait de la complexit6 et des contestations relatives au concept de
I'obligation de diligence, la Cour suprdme a clairement qualifid ces questions de
< th6oriques .. Cet article confirme que ces questions sont thdoriques, mais insiste
sur le fait que ce qualificatif souligne qu'il s'agitde questions fondamentales non
seulement pour comprendre la faute de n6gligence, mais dgalement la nature et la
forme du raisonnement de la common law. Les auteurs, en soulignant les erreurs
dans larrdt de la Cour suprdme du Canada-mauvaise terminologie, erreurs sur
le nom du juge, confusion quant j la structure de lexamen visant &ddterminer
s'il existe une obligation de diligence et omission d'un preddent importantrelbvent des manquements aux quatre activit6s principales de la common law:
situer, nommer, identifier et se souvenir Ils avancent que limage, les sons et
les fluctuations de la < conversation refl~tent la methodologie de la common
law-le fait qu'elle 6tablit des liens entre le passe et le futur en faisant appel &un
raisonnement analogique imparfait, mais dvocateur-etaffirment Iimportancede
porter attention 6 la signification des mots, au nom des juges, 6 la structure de
'examen et &I'importance de l'histoire.
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Introduction
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down a unanimous decision
in the negligence case of Cooper v Hobart.' Investors who had lost
substantial funds due to the misconduct of a mortgage broker brought a
claim against a provincial Registrar of Mortgage Brokers. At issue was
whether the Registrar was properly understood to owe a duty of care
to the plaintiffs or, in other words, whether the Registrar could be held
responsible in the tort of negligence for the financial losses suffered by the
investors. The Court held that no such duty was owed and thus that there
was no possibility of a successful claim for compensation. The decisionand more specifically its articulation of the "rule" for determining duty
of care-has been incorporated into Canadian law and language of
negligence.
While the story from which the case arose is straightforward, the story
in law against which the case was resolved is not. As jurists familiar with
the development of the tort of negligence in Anglo-Canadian common law
know all too well, the contours of the narrative of pure economic loss
caused by negligent words or actions are difficult to trace with confidence
1.

2001 SCC 79, 3 SCR 537 [Cooper].
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and clarity. Aware of the complexity of establishing a duty of care in a case
like Cooper, the Supreme Court of Canada openly acknowledged ongoing
challenges. And then, as it purported to take on those challenges, the Court
stated: "To some extent, these concerns are academic."2
This paper suggests that the concerns are indeed "academic."' But,
rather than justifying their marginalization, that label should bring them
to the centre of an important ongoing reflection not only about the
particular question of duty of care in the tort of negligence but about the
very nature and form of common law reasoning and methodology. We
make this argument by reference to the idea of "conversation" both as a
description of common law practice and as an ideal which exemplifies
its promises and possibilities, and which offers a benchmark or point of
reference from which to critique it. By suggesting conversation as an apt
metaphor for common law, we explore the responsibilities that come with
participation in that conversation. Whether students or teachers, lawyers
or judges, contributors to the common law are familiar with its back and
forth rhythm. To understand, work with, and critique common law, we
must appreciate the interaction of speakers and listeners at the same time
that we trace substantive principles and approaches.
Duty of care in negligence is one strand of the dynamic conversation
embodied by common law and serves as a fruitful example of its shape
and characteristics. In this paper, we argue that the Supreme Court of
Canada failed to appreciate the very nature and form of common law
in formulating what has become, in the intervening ten years, the socalled "Cooper-Anns" 4 rule. 5 The Court seemed to understand neither
2.
Ibid at 27.
3.
As Peter Birks elegantly stated: "The word 'academic' stands for taking things seriously, getting
to the bottom of them and finding out the truth," in "The Academic and the Practitioner" (1998) 18
Legal Studies 397 at 406.
4.
Anns v Merton London Borough Council, [1978] AC 728 [Anns].
5.
For references to the Court's restatement of the Anns test in Cooper, see Edwards v Law Society
of Upper Canada, 2001 SCC 80, [2001] 3 SCR 562; Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69,
[2003] 3 SCR 263 at para 46-51; Childs v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1 SCR 643; Young v
Bella, 2006 SCC 3, [2006] 1 SCR 108; Hill v Hamilton- Wentworth Regional Police Services Board,
2007 SCC 41 at 21-25, 31, 43, 136 [Hill v Hamilton]; Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD, 2007
SCC 38, [2007] 3 SCR 83 [SylApps] (Anns was "definitively refined" by Cooper at 23); Mustapha v
Culligan of CanadaLtd, 2008 SCC 27; Holland v Saskatchewan, 2008 SCC 42 (referring to the Anns
test as having been "adapted and refined" by Cooperat 8); Design Services Ltd v Canada, 2008 SCC
22. Provincial courts continue to apply the "Cooper/Anns test": see McMillan v CanadaMortgage and
Housing Corporation,2008 BCCA 543; Williams v Ontario, 2009 ONCA 378; Nette v Stiles, 2009
ABQB 422; Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corporation,2010 ONSC 2421. The most recent related
cases in the Supreme Court continue to draw on Cooperas a guiding reference, even if the terminology
of a "Cooper/Anns test" seems to have faded: Fullowka v Pinkerton s of CanadaLtd, 2010 SCC 5,
[2010] 1 SCR 132 [Fullowka v Pinkerton], and Reference re Broome v Prince EdwardIsland, 2010
SCC 11, [2010] 1 SCR 360 [Re Broome].
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how to participate in a complex common law conversation, nor why it
was crucial to do so in a responsible way. In labelling "academic" the
concerns voiced over shaping the principles of the tort of negligence in
Anglo-Canadian common law, the Supreme Court of Canada appeared to
disparage the central characteristic of the common law itself: its linking
of past to future through imperfect yet evocative analogical reasoning.
In other words, the Supreme Court's errors, while seemingly trivial and
a part of the messy stuff of normal common law conversation, actually
contravene key elements of conversation considered as an "ideal." Why
does this matter? Because jurists working within any legal tradition build
persuasive arguments when they understand and respect the sources and
shape of that tradition. Within common law, that means taking seriously
the words used to express ideas, and paying attention to the form through
which content is articulated, developed, sustained, and modified.
Anote on the methodology ofthis paper should accompany the mapping
out of its substantive claims and directions. Explicitly emphasizing the
shape or form of common law against the concrete context of a selected
substantive issue (here, the duty of care in the tort of negligence causing
pure economic loss) is a project central to a course in "Advanced
Common Law Obligations" taken by law students at McGill University. 6
A mandatory component of the curriculum, the course follows on the heels
of introductory courses in tort and contract that integrate common and civil
law traditions, systems, approaches, and language. Written by a professor
of the course together with a doctoral student who acted as assistant for the
course over two years, this paper represents a pedagogical conversation
made possible by interactions within the classroom and beyond. That level
of conversation comes together with two other intersecting conversations:
an ongoing conversation among observers, commentators, and academic
participants from which we draw our sources, and the conversation of the
common law itself-most notably recorded in the written judgments of its
principal speakers.

6. On McGill's trans-systemic approach to teaching civil and common law traditions, see:
Harry Arthurs, "Madly Off in One Direction: McGill's New Integrated, Polyjural, Transsystemic
Law Programme" (2005) 50 McGill U 707; Harry W Arthurs, "Law and Learning in an Era of
Globalization" (2009) 10 German Law Journal 639; Daniel Jutras, "Two arguments for Cross-Cultural
Legal Education" in HD Assman, G Broiggemeir & R Sether, eds, UnterschiedlicheRechtskulturenKonvergenz des Reschtesdenkens/DifferentLegal Cultures-ConvergenceofLegal Reasoning (Baden
Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001) 75; Nicholas Kasirer, "Bijuralism in Law's Empire and in Law's
Cosmos" (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 29.
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While Cooper has received attention elsewhere as a substantive
reference in the law of negligence,' it serves here as a fruitful site for
reflection on the methodology of the common law tradition. In Part One,
we identify several remarkable errors in the judgment itself: all errors that
underline characteristics of common law reasoning and development.
We suggest that the errors signal a failure as responsible contributor to,
and participant in, common law conversation on the part of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Cooper. In Part Two, we retrace in broad strokes the
contours of the narrative from Donoghue to Cooper and beyond.' In Part
Three, we point to the ways in which the image, sounds, and fluctuation
of conversation all capture the method of common law in a way that
remains beyond the reach of any attempt to map or chart rules and tests,
principles and policy. We conclude that "academic" concerns, whether in
the classroom or courtroom, case law or commentary, are at the heart of
the principles, process, and pedagogy of common law conversation.
I. Cooper v Hobart-egregiouserrorsand methodological mistakes
Cooper at first glance appears to be precisely the judgment that the
Canadian common law of the tort of negligence had been waiting for:
an opportunity for a full and unanimous court to assert and articulate the
"test" for establishing a duty of care. The facts themselves were not new
or particularly challenging-the court had dealt with a similar factual
scenario in Hercules Managements v Ernst & Young' when deciding if
auditors reporting on a company owed investing shareholders a duty of
care. In agreeing to hear Cooper, the court thus promised to revisit what
was perceived to be a problematic area of law and to refine its formulation
of the Anns test for determining the existence of a duty of care. In its
tone and approach, the Supreme Court suggested that its judgment would
dispense with the need to revisit the messy history of economic loss in
7.
Cooper was described as "a landmark decision," which "signals the end of the untrammeled
expansion of negligence liability in the Canadian context": Jason W Neyers "Distilling Duty: The
Supreme Court of Canada amends Anns" (2002) 118 LQR 221; and a "dramatic turning point" that
"put an end to the unprecedented expansion of the law": Jason W Neyers & Una Gabie, "Canadian
Tort Law since Cooper v. Hobart" (2005 & 2006) 13 Torts LJ 1, and 14 Torts LJ 1. For criticism of
the reasoning and cogency of Cooper see Stephen GA Pitel, "Negligence: Canada remakes the Anns
test" (2002) 61:2 Cambridge Law Journal 252; Nicholas Rafferty, "The Test for the Imposition of a
Duty of Care: Elucidation or Obfuscation by the Supreme Court of Canada" (2002) 18 PN 218. See
also Paula Giliker, "Revisiting Pure Economic Loss: Lessons to be Leamt from the Supreme Court
of Canada?" (2005) 25:1 Legal Studies 49. For qualified praise of the Cooper decision see Bruce
Feldthusen, "The Anns/Cooper Approach to Duty of Care" (2002) 18 Constitutional Law Review 67
[Feldthusen, "Anns/Cooper Approach"]; and Ernest J Weinrib, "The Disintegration of Duty" in M
Stuart Madden, ed, Exploring Tort Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
8. Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 at 619 [Donoghue].
9.
(1997), 146 DLR (4th) 577 at 591 [Hercules].
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future cases. Instead, from this case on, courts would simply ask: is this
relationship similar to that recognized in a past case? If so, the duty of care
question is answered, and if not, then the court should move explicitly and
openly to an analysis of policy concerns, asking whether policy directs
them to establish a duty of care.
But, in re-telling the story that led them to Cooper, the Supreme Court
committed several remarkable errors: it used the wrong word, it named the
wrong judge, it confused the elements of the duty of care inquiry, and it
omitted to mention a prior judgment that forms an important precedent in
this area of the law. Below we briefly describe these four errors, identifying
them in turn as an error of words, an error of naming judges, an error in
understanding structural elements, and an error in precedent. We find that
the errors signal failures in the four principal activities engaged in doing
the common law: placing, naming, identifying, and remembering. Those
failures are then explored, leading to our suggestion that they violate the
common law's rules of construction and conversation.
1. Words-placing
In its reference to Donoghue, the Supreme Court in Cooper asserts
that Donoghue revolutionized the common law "by replacing the old
categories of tort recovery with a single comprehensive principle-the
negligence principle.""o Lord Atkin's judgment in Donoghue is known
for articulating the neighbour principle in the tort of negligence-a tort
which already existed-as a particular way of understanding duty of care.
Thus, the judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson moves negligence from
a tort recognized in certain relationships to a tort grounded in the duty
of care each one of us owes to our "neighbours." This first error in the
Supreme Court judgment is an error of words. Using "negligence" instead
of "neighbour" is a failure to situate or place words with care. Particularly
when, as in the case of the neighbour principle, those words serve to shape
the obligations central to the common law tort of negligence, getting them
right is crucial. A failure to do so signals a foundational misunderstanding.
2. Judges-naming
Second, the Court in Cooper cites Lord Atkin as having declared in
Donoghue that "the categories of negligence are not closed."" Instead,
it was Lord Macmillan who stated that "the categories of negligence
are never closed." The Supreme Court's mistake in attributing Lord
Macmillan's words to Lord Atkin might be seen as paying lip service to
10. Supra note 1 at 22.
11. Ibidat3l.
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Lord Atkin's lofty principle while actually following Lord Macmillan, an
approach which has been suggested as characteristic of the development
of negligence law in the Supreme Court of Canada.12 And yet, the Court
commits an error of naming. It wrongly puts not only the words but the
approach of one judge in the mouth of another. An error in naming fails
to attribute a statement to its rightful speaker. It fails to consider the
situatedness of the voices of the judges as individual participants in the
common law.
3. Structure-identifying
Third, the judgment states that the first stage of the test for the duty of care
is: "[was] the harm that occurred the reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the defendant's act?" 3 But the foreseeability of injury is a question of
proximate cause. The question of foreseeability relevant to whether a duty
of care is owed is whether this plaintiffwas foreseeable. As common law
courts have considered recovery for injuries not traditionally recognized,
the type of damage suffered by the plaintiff has affected the duty of care
question, and judges have asked whether the duty of care extends to a
plaintiff suffering this type of damage. But this does not mean that the duty
of care question is a question of foreseeability of damage. The duty of this
defendant to this plaintiff remains the core of the tort of negligence.14 This
is an error in understanding and identifying: a failure of structure and of
asking the right question at the right place.
4. Precedent-remembering
Fourth, the court sets out the "categories in which proximity has been
recognized,"" arranged according to different situations in which
recovery for pure economic loss has been allowed. From this listwhich encompasses liability for negligent misstatement,' 6 a duty on
public authorities to inspect housing developments with care (Anns and
Kamloops"), and cases where the relationship between the claimant and
owner of damaged property constitutes a joint venture (Norsk" and Bow

12. "...while paying lip service to Lord Atkin's statement, still dealt with the law in terms of more
or less discrete categories of duty situation": David J lbbetson, An HistoricalIntroductionto the Law
of Obligations(Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1999) at 191.
13. Supra note I at 30.
14. As Justice Cardozo insists in Palsgrafv Long Island RailroadCo, 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99,
negligence is a "term of relation" (at 101), and Lord Atkin cites the judgment with approval as he
formulates the neighbour principle for negligence.
15. Supra note I at 36.
16. Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & PartnersLtd, [ 1964] AC 465 [Hedley Byrne].
17. Kamloops (City) v Nielsen, [1984] 2 SCR 2 [Kamloops].
18. CanadianNational Railway Co v Norsk PacificSteamship Co, [1992] 1 SCR 1021 [Norsk].
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Valley 9)-thecourt omits a significant unanimous decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada on pure economic loss prior to Cooper: Winnipeg
Condominium CorporationNo 36 v Bird Construction Co. 20 In that case,
La Forest J wrote for the court in establishing the possibility of recovery
for pure economic loss in the situation of dangerously defective premises.
One commentator at a loss for understanding this rather bizarre omission
could only say: "I suspect it was inadvertent." 21 Whether a mistake, or
implicit realignment with the House of Lords in its disregard for Winnipeg
Condo,22 the Court makes an error of precedent. It fails to incorporate
history, to acknowledge and remember what has come before.
These errors all take place in a part of the Supreme Court judgment
labelled "academic." The Court may have meant "academic" in the
sense that full discussion of these considerations could be considered
peripheral to the task of deciding liability in this case. And the errors we
have identified in the court's discussion of these considerations might
be deemed superficial, only significant as fodder for ruminations on the
quality of Supreme Court of Canada clerks and the treatment of private
law issues by the highest appellate court of Canada. Indeed, commentary
on the Cooper case has tended to mirror the attitude of the court as it skips
over this part of the judgment, anxious to reach the court's restatement of
the Anns test.23
However, characterizing this part of the discussion as irrelevant or
unworthy of attention misses the point of Cooper and other cases on pure
economic loss. Judgment is never a theoretical exercise in that it has real
consequences for the parties involved, 24 and, indeed, we have no particular
objection to the court's conclusion as to liability in this instance. But the
errors in the judgment-and the labelling of a central preoccupation in tort
law as "academic"-are striking. The fact that these errors appear within
the context of a judgment that is so significant in the substantive evolution
of economic loss, and that is presented as a paradigmatic judgment and an

19. Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 1210 [Bow
Valley].
20. [19951 I SCR 85 [Winnipeg Condo].
21. Feldthusen, "Anns/Cooper Approach", supra note 7 at 71.
22. D & F Estates v Church Commissioners, [ 198911 AC 177 [D&F Estates]; Murphy v Brentwood
DistrictCouncil, [ 1991] I AC 398 [Murphy v Brentwood].
23. Allen M Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 8th ed (ON: Lexis Nexis Canada,
2006). The text goes straight to Cooper s restatement of the Anns test in paragraphs 30, 3 1, and 34. See
also Pitel, supranote 7.
24. Judicial interpretation "takes place on a field of pain and death": Robert Cover, "Violence and
the Word" in Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat, eds, Narrative, Violence, and the Law:
The Essays ofRobert Cover (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993) at 203.
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essential part of the common law story in Canada about the duty of care in
negligence, demands that they be taken seriously.
We argue that the errors in Cooper are symptoms or reflections of
methodological failures to appreciate the architecture of common law
conversation, and the responsibility of those who participate and move
the conversation along. They are failures to care about the language of the
common law, about who the judge is, about how common law arguments
are structured, and about the past. In other words, they are failures in
placing, naming, identifying, and remembering. What appear at first to be
mere, albeit messy, mistakes, actually serve to highlight the importance
of classification, naming, elements, and history in the normative structure
of the common law. The metaphor of conversation-with its particular
characteristics and constraints-illustrates that structure.
II. Telling and retelling the story of Donoghue v Stevenson
Situating the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in Cooper requires an
understanding of the context upon which the case draws and within which
it is located. In particular, appreciating the errors identified above calls out
for a substantive reminder of the legacy of Donoghue v Stevenson. While
the common law story of the modem tort of negligence usually begins in
1932 with Donoghue, the House of Lords judgment is more than a starting
point. Instead, as sketched in Part II of this paper, it is the touchstone for
telling and retelling the negligence narrative in the hands of all judges and
courts asked to determine the existence of a duty of care.
In tracing the reception and ever-developing meaning of Donoghue v
Stevenson, teachers, writers, judges, and students alike must pass through
certain cases-Dorset Yacht, 25 Hedley Byrne, Anns, among others-and
grapple with a cluster of key words and concepts including neighbour,
proximity, categories, and pure economic loss. These are the weights or
anchors of the negligence story, what Cass Sunstein has called "fixed
point[s]." 26 While never actually fixed in substance, they act as reference
points for the law that precedes and follows, and demand to be reread
and reconsidered. Here, then, we refresh the reader's memory of the
Donoghue narrative and provide a sketch of the story line upon which
Cooper now sits as a point. We do so through four sections which recall
the themes raised by the errors noted in Part I: Words, Judges, Structure,
and Precedent. That is, this Part serves to illustrate the substance of the
area of law to which Cooper contributes and, at the same time, to show

25.
26.

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co, [ 1970] AC 1004 [Dorset Yacht].
Cass R Sunstein, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741 at 771.
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the ways in which that substance rests on four central and characteristic
elements-placing, naming, identifying, and remembering-of common
law methodology and development.
In "Words" we examine how the neighbour principle came to be
articulated as a defining feature of the tort of negligence. In "Judges"
we trace the development of proximity as the key to determining duty of
care, and the ways in which that notion has taken on different meanings
depending on the speaker and context. In "Structure" we examine case
law in the Supreme Court of Canada that, as a result of finding proximity
inadequate to the task of circumscribing responsibility in situations
of pure economic loss, increasingly appealed to policy for guidance.
In "Precedent" we examine how Cooper appears to transform the duty
question in negligence-"who is my neighbour?"-from one of proximity
to one of policy. By telling the substantive story through a framework
composed of these four structural pillars, we not only underscore their
importance, but also prepare the reader for Part III's discussion of
responsible "conversation" among participants in common law.
1. Words: who is my neighbour?
As noted above, the first error committed by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Cooper occurs as it rightly nods to the 1932 House of Lords judgment
in Donoghue, the case inevitably cited as the beginning of the story of the
modem tort of negligence. According to the Supreme Court, Donoghue
"replac[ed] the old categories of tort recovery with a single comprehensive
principle-the negligence principle." But the various torts have not been
eliminated and replaced by the tort of negligence, even if it is true that
this particular tort has expanded dramatically in significance and scope
post-Donoghue. Rather, the "neighbour principle" purported to replace the
categories of relationship inscribed with the duty to take reasonable care.
Before 1932, there existed no strongly articulated and generalized concept
or principle for the tort of negligence.27 Instead, a list of relationships based
largely on particular vocations and situations required that appropriate
care be taken so as not to inflict harm of one sort or another. If a plaintiff
claimed damages to compensate for some harm he had suffered, he had to
show that the relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and the victim
fell into one of these existing categories.

27. For a more in-depth and nuanced discussion of pre-Donoghue negligence law, see further
Michael Lobban, "Common Law Reasoning and the Foundations of Modem Private Law" (2007) 32
Austl J Leg Phil 39; lbbetson, supra note 12 at 169-201.
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Donoghue moved negligence beyond specifically recognized
categories of relationship, most strikingly in the form of Lord Atkin's
general duty of care owed to one's neighbour:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you
must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my
neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care
to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The
answer seems to be-persons who are so closely and directly affected by
my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being
so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which
are called in question.28
The narrow holding of Donoghue-that a manufacturer owes a duty of
care to the ultimate consumer in the case of goods not susceptible to
intermediate inspection-did not depend on the neighbour principle.
Indeed, Lord MacMillan finds the same duty through incremental
category-based reasoning, based on a combination of detailed analysis of
past decisions and an explicit responsiveness to changing circumstances:
The grounds of action may be as various and manifold as human errancy;
and the conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation
to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of judgment
must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life. The
categories of negligence are never closed. 2 9
Subsequent decisions of the House of Lords reflected the significance
of the neighbour principle, even as they grappled with the tension and
challenges it produces. For example, in Hedley Byrne, Lord Devlin
acknowledges the impact of Lord Atkin's judgment, 0 while at the same
time adopting Lord MacMillan's more categorical approach:
Now, it is not, in my opinion, a sensible application of what Lord Atkin
was saying for a Judge to be invited on the facts of any particular case
to say whether or not there was "proximity" between the plaintiff and
the defendant. That would be a misuse of a general conception and it
is not the way in which English law develops. What Lord Atkin did

28. Donoghue, supra note 8 at 580-581, per Lord Atkin.
29. Ibid at 619, per Lord MacMillan.
30. "1 approach the consideration of the first and fundamental question in the way in which Lord
Atkin approached the same sort of question-that is, in essence the same sort, though in particular
very different-in Donoghue v Stevenson. If counsel for the respondent's proposition is the result of
the authorities, then, as Lord Atkin said [1932] AC 562 at 582: '1 should consider the result a grave
defect in the law and so contrary to principle that I should hesitate long before following any decision
to that effect which had not the authority of this House,"' Hedley Byrne, supra note 16 at 602.
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was to use his general conception to open up a category of cases giving
rise to a special duty. It was already clear that the law recognised the
existence of such a duty in the category of articles that were dangerous
in themselves.'
We find Lord Devlin working hard to reconcile principle and categories
by characterizing Donoghue as an extension of already present categories,
or "the widening of an old category or as the creation of a new and similar
one," 32 and Lord Atkin's neighbour principle as "a general conception
[which] can be used to produce other categories in the same way."
Indeed, each Law Lord in Hedley Byrne specifically refutes the plaintiff's
argument that Donoghue already provides an answer to the question of
potential liability for negligent misstatements resulting in pure economic
loss, but at the same time turns to Donoghue for support in opening up
precisely that possibility.
The centrality of, combined with resistance to, Lord Atkin's neighbour
principle characterizes not only Hedley Byrne but Dorset Yacht, the
remaining case in the "trilogy" of leading negligence law cases. There,
Viscount Dilhome carefully circumscribes the judicial function:
We are being asked to create in reliance on Lord Atkin's words an
entirely new and novel duty and one which does not arise out of any
novel situation. 1, of course, recognize that the common law develops
by the application of well established principles to new circumstances,
but I cannot accept that the application of Lord Atkin's words... suffices
to impose a new duty on the Home Office and on others in charge of
persons in lawful custody of the kind suggested.. .we are not concerned
with what the law should be but with what it is. The absence of authority
shows that no such duty now exists. If there should be one, that is, in my
view, a matter for the legislature and not for the courts.34
Lord Morris, in the same case, calls the Home Office's liability "glaringly
obvious,"" saying it would be "contrary to the fitness ofthings"36 were there
to be no duty, and Lord Reid elevates Lord Atkin's words into a "statement
of principle" which "ought to apply unless there is some justification or
valid explanation for its exclusion."37 Lord Diplock, careful to distinguish

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid at 524.
Ibid at 525.
Ibid.
Dorset Yacht, supra note 25 at 1045.
Ibid at 1034.
Ibid at 1039.
Ibid at 1027.
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Dorset Yacht from Donoghue, takes a more cautious approach to what the
neighbour principle might mean:
Used as a guide to characteristics which will be found to exist in conduct
and relationships which give rise to a legal duty of care this aphorism
marks a milestone in the modem development of the law of negligence.
But misused as a universal it is manifestly false."
Early on in the Donoghue negligence narrative, then, it became obvious
that the neighbour principle, although perceived as central, would be
subject to constant interpretation as to its scope and significance. While it
transformed the structure and scope of the duty of care question in the tort
of negligence, Lord Atkin's principle continues to provoke discussion and
disagreement. Cooper became part of that legacy as the Supreme Court
of Canada was asked to determine the existence of a duty of care for the
purposes of establishing liability for negligent acts or words. In refusing
to find a duty of care, the Court contributes to the ever-developing answer
to the question "who is my neighbour?"
2. Judges: proximity as principle
The concept of relationship-whether grounded in a general principle
or in recognized categories-as a way to establish the duty to take care
owed by one person to another, demands some analysis of closeness or
"proximity." Although earlier case law had foreshadowed this idea of a
relationship, set within a more general discourse of responsibility to those
whom our actions might affect, 9 Lord Atkin's judgment in Donoghue
explicitly turned to "proximity" to explain what constitutes "closely and
directly" in his neighbour principle:
I think that this sufficiently states the truth if proximity be not confined
to mere physical proximity, but be used, as I think it was intended, to
extend to such close and direct relations that the act complained of
directly affects a person whom the person alleged to be bound to take
care would know would be directly affected by his careless act.4 0
Lord Atkin leaves the question of proximity open, rather than pointing
to specific categories of relationship previously recognized in negligence
law as illustrations of the closeness requisite to establishing a duty of care.

38. Ibid at 1060.
39. Lord Atkin and Lord Macmillan both drew on Brett MR in Heaven v Pender (II QB 503) as
well as Cardozo J in Macpherson v Buick Motor Company (1916), 217 NY 382, Ill NE 1050. See
also Percy H Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort: Tagore Law Lectures delivered in 1930
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931).
40. Donoghue,supra note 8 at 581.
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Wrongly attributed by the Supreme Court of Canada to Lord Atkin, the
focus on categories of negligence and on their flexibility characterizes
the judgment of Lord MacMillan. Both judgments, separately and in
their co-existence, underscore the key element of proximity in the tort of
negligence. The intertwining of these two voices in their analysis of the
proximity between manufacturer and consumer lays the foundation for
the continued multiplicity of approaches, sometimes complementary and
sometimes conflicting, to "proximity" as the touchstone for determining
the existence of a duty of care in the tort of negligence.
Indeed, in order to understand the importance and elusiveness of
"proximity," whether as notion or principle or test, it is necessary to pay
close attention to how it is engaged in the hands of particular judges. As the
contours of duty of care were refined, most noticeably in the context of pure
economic loss, concern over the inadequacy of "reasonable foreseeability"
as a way to limit recovery 4' prompted heightened investment in the project
of giving substantive meaning to "proximity." Thus, for Lord Devlin in
Hedley Byrne, requisite proximity in negligence is established and a duty
of care owed to the recipient of information disclosed by someone with
special knowledge and the expectation of reliance on the information.
And for Lord Diplock in Dorset Yacht, proximity is satisfied in a careful
analogy-based analysis of the relationship between the negligent guards
and the owner of the boat damaged by the delinquent boys who take
advantage of that negligence in order to escape from their island.
In the 1978 formulation of what became the Anns test, Lord
Wilberforce attempted to combine Donoghue, Hedley Byrne, and Dorset
Yacht together into a coherent approach grounded in proximity and refined
by policy considerations. The first stage of the Anns test asked
"whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has
suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former,
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter-in
which case a prima facie duty of care arises."42
The second stage, arising after a prima facie duty of care has been
established, asked whether there exist "any policy considerations which
would mitigate against such a duty of care." 43

41. "Economic interests in a competitive market economy are inherently vulnerable to foreseeable
injury": Stephen Perry, "Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence" (1992) 42
UTLJ 247 at 264.
42. Anns, supranote 4 at 751-752.
43. Ibid at 752.
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The Anns test marked a broad and generous approach to proximity
for the purposes of establishing, at least initially, a duty to take reasonable
care. It also signalled the beginning of a new explicitness surrounding
the inclusion of policy analysis in determining liability for negligence.
Although subsequently rejected by the House of Lords," it was
enthusiastically adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada and relabelled
the Anns/Kamloops test.4 5 In subsequent Canadian case law, "proximity"
was put under increasing pressure to circumscribe responsibility as courts
grappled with relational economic loss, dangerous products or buildings,
liability of public authorities, and the consequences of careless words. As
insisted upon by Desmond Manderson, proximity "captures a distinct,
crucial, though imprecise element of the constitution of responsibility."4 6
But Supreme Court of Canada judges have shied away from the challenge,
implied in Manderson's assertion, of finding a way to give significance to
"proximity" as a principle.
Thus, for example, in the 1992 judgment in Norsk, the two principal
opinions display, on the one hand, a highly skeptical approach to proximity
and, on the other, an over-generalized approach to the notion. Justice
McLachlin observes that "the concept of proximity may be seen as an
umbrella, covering a number of disparate circumstances in which the
relationship between the parties is so close that it is just and reasonable
to permit recovery in tort."47 Her understanding and application of Anns/
Kamloops appears to track Lord MacMillan's starting point of flexible
categories. 48 Justice La Forest asserts in his judgment in Norsk that
proximity is "a result, rather than a principle."4 9 In doing so, he redirects
the analysis away from a concentrated focus on the closeness of the

44. In D&F Estatesand Murphy v Brentwood.
45. In Kamloops, Wilson 1 suggested the following slightly modified version of the Anns test,
asking "(1) is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties.. .so that, in the reasonable
contemplation of [one person], carelessness on its part might cause damage to [the other] person? If
so, (2) are there any considerations which ought to negative or limit (a) the scope of the duty and (b)
the class of persons to whom it is owed or (c) the damages to which a breach of it may give rise?" at
10-11.
46. Desmond Manderson, Proximity, Levinas, and the Soul of Law (Quebec: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2006) at 144.
47. Norsk, supra note 18 at 1152.
48. Ibidat 1149.
49. Ibidat 1114.
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wrongdoer and victim, and, with the assistance of Bruce Feldthusen,so
toward an analysis of context and kind of loss.
When "duty of care" is at issue and acts as the principal hurdle to
liability and compensation, it would seem that the closeness between
defendant and plaintiff would be central to the analysis. And yet, the way
to assess that closeness, for the purposes of ascribing potential tort liability
in negligence, continues to perplex courts and distinguish individual
judges. Lord Diplock warns us in Dorset Yacht that Lord Reid's emphasis
on foreseeability will stretch proximity too far to do any real work;
Lord Wilberforce acknowledges in Anns that a corrective in the form of
policy considerations must go hand-in-hand with proximity; Justice La
Forest discards proximity in favour of categories each with its own set
of contextual considerations; Justice McLachlin holds onto proximity in
theory, but describes it "not so much as a test in itself, but as a broad
concept which is capable of subsuming different categories of cases
involving different factors."'
In every case, as pointed out by Geoffrey Samuels,52 the stories and
images and concrete facts describing the encounter between tortfeasor and
victim shape the analysis of whether a duty of care does or should exist. The
ominous opening of the "floodgates" of compensation for pure economic
loss (after Hedley Byrne), the terror of "dangerous" products (starting with
Mrs. Donoghue's snail), the indignance over shoddy foundations (Anns
and Kamloops) all play a role in understanding the full panoply of cases
that intertwine to produce a composite and always-shifting picture of
"proximity." But that picture only comes into focus through attention to
the plurality of voices that co-exist, complement each other, and sometimes
conflict. Keeping track of those voices, and the approaches to proximity
and duty of care that they reflect, is crucial to an understanding of how
and why the Supreme Court of Canada produced a unanimous judgment
in Cooper. That is, even as the distinctiveness of particular judges fades
in the context of a unitary judgment, significantly different strands of the
story require appropriate labelling and appreciation.
50. La Forest J adopted Bruce Feldthusen's analysis of five categories of economic loss cases in
"Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1990-1991) Can Bus LJ 356 at 357-358; see
Norsk, supra note 18 at 299-300 and Winnipeg Condo, supra note 20 at 199. Feldthusen observes
that in practice Canadian courts have taken the incremental approach of the English courts, generally
finding liability only in the familiar pockets, while avoiding "the proximity road to nowhere so long
taken by the Australian High Court": Bruce Feldthusen, "The Anns/Cooper Approach to Duty of Care
for Pure Economic Loss: The Emperor has no Clothes" (2003) 18 Construction Law Reports (3d ed)
67.
51. Norsk, supra note 18 at 1151; cited in Hercules, supranote 9 at 23.
52. Geoffrey Samuels, Epistemologyand Method in Lav (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003).
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3. Structure: categorizationplus policy
Awareness of, and frustration with, the potentially circular nature of
any inquiry into proximity has provoked the Supreme Court of Canada
into increasing reliance on what Lord Wilberforce had named "policy"
implications of finding a duty of care. Justice La Forest, writing for the
court in Winnipeg Condo, accepted what he understood to be an explicit
invitation contained in the Anns/Kamloops test to engage in a discussion
of policy considerations such as the necessity of providing "incentives
for plaintiffs to mitigate potential losses."" Even as he moved beyond
proximity to "policy" in Winnipeg Condo, Justice La Forest maintained
focus on the nature of the obligation at stake. In the same vein as Justice
Laskin in a dissenting judgment decades before in Rivtow Marine54
(referred to with approval by Lord Wilberforce in Anns), he highlighted
the risk of danger and personal injury presented by defective premises.
Defining that risk as core to the tort of negligence, the Supreme Court of
Canada in Winnipeg Condo explicitly added dangerous premises to the list
of categories in which recovery for negligently caused pure economic loss
will be allowed.
Carl Stychin writes that Justice La Forest's judgment "provides
a model of judicial reasoning, effortlessly combining issues of judicial
principle and public policy."" Cass Sunstein might see in that combination
a striving for what he refers to as the necessary "reflective equilibrium"5 6
between principle and policy considerations. Indeed, the combination of
honest recourse to policy, lucid explanation, and attention to the functional
context of decisions has been celebrated as characteristic of Supreme Court
of Canada jurisprudence, most notably during the era of the "Dickson
Court,"" but also as compared more recently to its English counterpart."
The attempt to give meaning to the slippery and multi-faceted notion
of "policy," as applied in a spectrum of contexts, may indeed be helpful
or even crucial. And yet, the risk-as illustrated in Cooper itself-is that
policy might overwhelm any substantive assessment of the relationship
at stake and of the potential obligation to take reasonable care vis-d-vis
potential victims in the plaintiff's shoes. The Court in Cooper,unanimous
53. Winnipeg Condo, supra note 20 at 37.
54. Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works, [1974] SCR 1189.
55. Carl F Stychin, "Dangerous Liaisons: New Developments in the Law of Defective Premises"
(1996) Legal Studies 387 at 416.
56. Sunstein, supra note 26 at 786.
57. See John PS McLaren, "The Dickson Approach to Liability in Tort" in Deloyed J Guth, ed, Brian
Dickson at The Supreme Court of Canada 1973-1990 (Winnipeg: Canadian Legal History Project,
1998) at 282.
58. See Giliker, supra note 7.
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as in Winnipeg Condo, assumes from the outset that the duty of care inquiry
involves balancing multiple policy interests. 9 It locates the significance of
Anns in "its recognition that policy considerations play an important role
in determining proximity in new situations." 60 Yet the Court complains
that Anns:
left doubt on the precise content of the first and second branches of
the new formulation of the negligence principle. Was the first branch
concerned with foreseeability only or foreseeability and proximity? If
the latter, was there duplication between policy considerations relevant
to proximity at the first stage and the second stage of the test?6'
Since the first branch of the Anns test refers explicitly to "a sufficient
relationship of proximity," the Court's claim to confusion is itself
confusing. Certainly Anns established the role of policy considerations
in determining a duty of care in new situations, but limited policy to
the second stage, reserving the first stage for an inquiry into proximity.
Having installed policy in both stages of the Anns test, the Cooper court
reassures us that there is no duplication because "different types of policy
considerations are involved at the two stages."62
Stage one policy considerations, according to Cooper, arise from the
relationship between the two parties," and are "diverse and depend on
the circumstances of the case. One searches in vain for a single unifying
characteristic.""6
59. The judgment cites H Street's The Law of Torts, which characterizes the inquiry of reasonable
foreseeability as a smokescreen for "the true judicial process," which was adjudicating matters of
policy. "As Street points out, the Donoghue v Stevenson foreseeability-negligence test, no matter how
it is phrased, conceals a balancing of interests. The quest for the right balance is in reality a quest for
prudent policy" at 29. "[l]t cannot be too strongly stressed that the use of [the] test of foreseeability in
order to determine whether there is a duty-relationship between the parties conceals the true judicial
process-that test is in fact a conclusion embracing within it, and yet concealing the identity of, the
several considerations of policy, and the balancing of interests which have led the court to decide that
a duty is owed"; Street, The Law of Torts, 7th ed (London: Butterworths, 1983) at 108, cited in Cooper
at 25.
60. Cooper, supra note I at 25.
61. Ibid at 26.
62. Ibid at 28.
63. "The proximity analysis involved at the first stage of the Anns test focuses on factors arising from
the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. These factors include questions of policy, in
the broad sense of that word. If foreseeability and proximity are established at the first stage, aprima
facie duty of care arises. At the second stage of the Anns test, the question still remains whether
there are residual policy considerations outside the relationship of the parties that may negative the
imposition of a duty of care. It may be, as the Privy Council suggests in Yuen Kun Yeu, that such
considerations will not often prevail. However, we think it useful expressly to ask, before imposing a
new duty of care, whether despite foresecability and proximity of relationship, there are other policy
reasons why the duty should not be imposed": ibid at 30.
64. Ibid at 35.

"Academic Concerns"-Caring about Conversation in
Canadian Common Law

423

Defining the relationship may involve looking at expectations,
representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved.
Essentially, these are factors that allow us to evaluate the closeness of
the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and to determine
whether it is just and fair having regard to that relationship to impose a
duty of care in law upon the defendant."5
Here then, the court lists terms-expectations, representations, reliance,
interests-as almost interchangeable post-factojustifications to be invoked
instrumentally for whichever conclusion the court reaches. The concepts
of "just and fair" replace the relational inquiry into duty of care that a term
like proximity provides, and the distinctiveness of judicial reasoning is
subordinated to a consideration of policy.
For the Court, there seems to be no necessary structure to the questions
to be asked as part of a duty of care inquiry.66 It appears to ignore, or fail
to understand, the difference between, on the one hand, finding a prima
facie duty of care exists but is negated by policy, and, on the other, finding
that a duty of care does not arise at all. 67 And it appears to cast aside the
distinctive location of the onus of proof involved in each stage. 68 The Court
is right to notice that there is overlap between the different questions to
be asked and that the type of injury or loss is relevant to certain aspects of
the inquiry. The consequence, however, need not be the one amorphous
question articulated by the Cooper court: "The underlying question is
whether a duty of care should be imposed, taking into account all relevant
factors disclosed by the circumstances." 6 9
As suggested by Stephen A Smith, Supreme Court of Canada
jurisprudence from Norsk to Cooper appears increasingly to adopt
what Stephen Waddams names a "bundle-of-factors" model of legal
reasoning that addresses liability "on the basis of an ever-changing list
of 'cumulatively and concurrently' relevant factors, such as insurance,
65. Ibid at 34.
66. "Provided the proper balancing of the factors relevant to a duty of care are considered, it may
not matter, so far as a particular case is concerned, at which 'stage' it occurs. The underlying question
is whether a duty of care should be imposed, taking into account all relevant factors disclosed by the
circumstances": ibidat 27.
67. "So long as the court is applying any notion ofaprimafacieduty, it does matter whether policy
factors relating to proximity or residual policy considerations are applied at the first stage or the
second. For example, while, having imposed a duty of care at stage one, the Court might ultimately
absolve a defendant of liability at stage two, the fact remains that a duty of care has been recognized":
Russell Brown, "Still Crazy after all these Years: Anns, Cooper v Hobart and Pure Economic Loss"
(2003) 36 University of British Columbia Law Review 159 at 183.
68. The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first two stages, but having discharged
that burden, the defendant then carries the burden of persuading the court that there are countervailing
policy arguments, see Hill v Hamilton, supranote 5.
69. Cooper, supra note I at 27.
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deterrence, loss spreading and indeterminate liability." 0 Having stripped
proximity of substantive meaning, the Supreme Court dispatches the duty
of care question through a process of analogy to categories defined by
the nature and context of the loss. Thus, categories of pure economic loss
provide the organizing framework for all negligence actions resulting in
this kind of damage." An organizing structure, characterized by the attempt
to map out different kinds of situations in which liability for negligently
created pure economic loss might be appropriate, is understandable and
even desirable. But, the jump from categorization directly to an allencompassing appeal to policy appears to give up on a principled attempt
to focus on duty of care as central to the tort of negligence.
Perhaps the Supreme Court of Canada's willingness to make "policy"
ubiquitous and expansive explains its somewhat sloppy attention to the
distinctive issues at stake in any analysis of liability in negligence. As
noted above in Part I, the Court mistakenly casts the duty question as one
of foreseeability of the type of damage suffered, thus merging proximate
cause and duty of care into one inquiry. This could have been done
explicitly, with explanation as to how the concern over duty often arises
in contexts where the kind of loss is problematic, and with an acceptance
that the overarching task for the court is always one of circumscribing
the tortfeasor's scope of liability. Instead, the Court indicates limited selfawareness as to how it mixes together foreseeability of the kind of damage
with proximity of the plaintiff. The call to policy seems to do away with
the need either to grasp, or to work with, a structured, principled analysis.
4. Precedent: Donoghue after Cooper
To appreciate the implications of Cooper and the turn from principle to
policy, the obvious place to look is Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence
following the 2001 judgment. Indeed, the Court has referred to the Anns
test-"definitively refined" in Cooper-as"the analytic divining rod used
by this Court for determining whether a duty of care exists." 7 2 Despite
the direction offered by this "divining rod," decisions subsequent to
Cooper have been obliged to linger at length over the judgment and refine
70. Stephen Smith, "A Map of the Common Law?" (2004) 40 Canadian Business Law Journal 364
at 268, citing Stephen Waddams, Dimensions of PrivateLaw: Categories and Concepts in AngloAmerican Legal Reasoning(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
71. Bruce Feldthusen's authoritative analysis of pure economic loss was cited by La Forest J in Norsk
and then Winnipeg Condo. In Winnipeg at 199, then two years later in Bow Valley the court adopted
La Forest J's conclusions to govern relational loss. Feldthusen in turn describes La Forest's "prophetic
dissenting judgment" in Norsk as a "breakthrough," in "Pure Economic Loss and Statutory Public
Authority Liability after Cooper v Hobart" (March 2005) online: <http://ssm.com/abstract-702081>
or <doi: 10.2139/ssrn.702081>.
72. SylApps, supra note 5 at 23.
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or reformulate the two-part test." In 2007 the Court stated that policy
considerations at both stages of the test were fairly interchangeable,
stressing the need for an overall grasp of "all relevant concerns." 74 In a
decision later that same year, after discussing "the possibility of some
blending of policy considerations"" between the two stages, the Court
echoed the House of Lords7 6 by proposing a three-stage test divided into,
first, reasonable foreseeability, second, proximity "such that it would be
fair and just to impose a duty," and, third, "residual" policy concerns.77 At
the same time, then, that the Court has maintained the definitive nature
of the Cooper formulation, that claim to the test's authoritative status has
been continually subject to structural refining and overhauling.
Looking beyond Cooper to later cases is not the only way to assess
its place in the story of the duty of care in the tort of negligence. We can
also look backwards, through the lens provided by Cooper, to observe its
impact on our understanding of preceding case law stretching all the way
back to Donoghue. Indeed, Cooper appears to have changed the teaching
and learning of tort liability for negligently caused pure economic loss.
After Cooper, the question of negligence-who is my neighbour-has
become less a question of proximity than of policy. 79 In their textbook,
Canadian Tort Law, Linden and Feldthusen cite Cooper when remarking
73. See further Neyers & Gabie, supra note 7. See in particular Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse 2003
SCC 69, [2003] 3 SCR 263 at paras 45-52 per Justice lacobucci; and Childs v Desormeaux, 2006
SCC 18, [2006] SCJ No 18, where Chief Justice McLachlin further recast the Anns test by viewing
reasonable foreseeability as one element of proximity: "(1) Is there a sufficiently close relationship
between the parties or proximity to justify imposition of a duty and, if so, (2) Are there policy
considerations which ought to negative or limit the scope of the duty, the class of persons to whom it
is owed or the damages to which breach may give rise" at para 11.
74. "In practice, there may be overlap between stage one and stage two considerations. We should
not forget that stage one and stage two of the Anns test are merely a means to facilitate considering
what is at stake. The important thing is that in deciding whether a duty of care lies, all relevant concerns
should be considered": Hill v Hamilton, supra note 5 at 31, citing Cooper at 37.
75. SylApps, supra note 5 at 33.
76. Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 605 recognized the new three-fold test of
foresight, proximity, and whether liability would be fair, just, and reasonable.
77. "Accordingly, in order to establish.. .a duty of care, (1) the harm complained of must have been
reasonably foreseeable, (2) there must have been sufficient proximity between [the parties] such that
it would be fair and just to impose a duty of care, and (3) there must be no residual policy reasons for
declining to impose such a duty": SylApps, supranote 5 at 33.
78. In the most recent negligence decisions, albeit not in the context of pure economic loss (Fullowka
v Pinkertons, re a claim made by miners again negligent managers; and Reference re Broome, re a
claim made by survivors of child abuse in a foster home), the Supreme Court continues to engage in the
necessary finessing of the Cooper "policy" considerations relevant at different stages of determining
duty of care. In both cases, the statutory context serves as the primary basis for determining the
proximity between tortfeasor and victim.
79. In 2007 the court cited Cooper: "the Donoghue v. Stevenson foreseeability-negligence test, no
matter how it is phrased, conceals a balancing of interests. The quest for the right balance is in reality
a quest for prudent policy" at 29, cited in Syl Apps, supranote 5 at 31.
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that "more recently the duty issue has been recognized as largely a matter
of policy."so Their chapter on "duty of care" opens with explicit policy
language: "The duty concept is a control device that enables courts to check
the propensity of juries to award damages in situations where matters of
legal policy would dictate otherwise."" CanadianTort Law is in turn cited
in almost all decisions applying Cooper82
Starting from Cooper and looking backwards holds the potential for
transforming history and what we take to be fixed points along its timeline.
The reluctance to open up the possibility of recovery for relational
economic loss (Norsk, Bow Valley), the justification for imposing liability
for the cost of repairing dangerously defective premises (Winnipeg Condo),
the limited possibilities of holding public authorities responsible for the
consequences of their lack of care (Dorset Yacht, Anns, Kamloops), the
parameters drawn around the responsibility to convey information with
appropriate attention (Hedley Byrne, Haig v Bamford," Henderson84 ),
and even the significance of establishing a line of responsibility from
manufacturer to ultimate consumer (Donoghue), are all subject to
rewriting. All are remodelled as precedent; all take on a different meaning.
All also become instances of categories into which new cases may fall and,
at the same time, potential sources for understanding policy as re-centred
by Cooper. That is, in 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada underscored the
importance of categories of duty of care situations, by suggesting that this
requirement "simply captures the basic notion of precedent."" According
to CanadianTort Law, this seems to mean that if a case falls into one of the
established categories in negligence law, then the Anns-Cooper two-step

80. Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 23 at 285.
81. Ibid at 265.
82. For a recent example see Mustapha v Culligan of CanadaLtd, 2008 SCC 27 at 5 [Mustapha].
83. Haig v Bamford etal, [1977] 1 SCR 466.
84. Henderson v Merrett Syndicates, [1995] 2 AC 145.
85. "The Court in Cooper introduced the idea that as the case law develops, categories of relationships
giving rise to a duty of care may be recognized, making it unnecessary to go through the Anns analysis.
The reference to categories simply captures the basic notion of precedent: where a case is like another
case where a duty has been recognized, one may usually infer that sufficient proximity is present and
that if the risk of injury was foreseeable, a prima facie duty of care will arise. On the other hand, if a
case does not clearly fall within a relationship previously recognized as giving rise to a duty of care,
it is necessary to carefully consider whether proximity is established": Childs at para 15. See also
Eliopouloset al v Ontario (MinisterofHealth and Long-Term Care), [2006] OJ No 4400 (Ont CA) at
12.
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analysis becomes unnecessary.8 6 In a later case, the Supreme Court in turn
cites the textbook.87
Casting as a threshold question the analogy of the present case to past
cases, to be answered independently of the two-stage duty of care inquiry,
begs the question of how close two cases have to be, and why. Without
relational analysis, there is no basis for deciding which policy concerns are
relevant, and no guidance for where to look to articulate the contours of the
duty of care and the limits of potential liability. Gone is careful attention
to the wording of past judgments as they grappled with the closeness of
wrongdoer and plaintiff, and to the factors that explain the existence or
absence of a duty to take requisite care. Scholarly writing relevant to
Cooper argues for the need to separate the relational element of the duty
of care from policy inquiries.88 For Desmond Manderson, "proximity
involves a one-to-one relationship where policy imports a one-to-many
relationship"89 ; for Ernest Weinrib, the Court's acceptance that duty is a
matter of "policy" has "led to a distaste for the abstract practical reasoning
that undergirds a general conception of duty." 0 Such scholars argue that
a duty of care inquiry must include occasion for properly normative and
relational reasoning, and that once proximity is represented as policy, the
core element of the duty of care has been ignored.9'
Rather than participating in a substantive assessment of the Cooper
court's explicit turn to both category and policy, we conclude our brief
sketch of the duty of care narrative in Anglo-Canadian negligence law
with a comment on the back-and-forth nature of situating any given
case in that narrative. That is, as we have indicated above, Cooper can
be studied by moving forward or by casting back. Donoghue itself begs

86. Linden & Feldthusen, supranote 24 at 293 and 302.
87. "As stated by AM Linden and B Feldthusen, categories of relationships that have been
recognized and relationships analogous to such pre-established categories need not be tested by the
Anns formula": Cooper, supranote I at 35-36; Mustapha, supra note 82 at para 5.
88. One exception is Giliker who, in noting the convergence of English and Canadian law, writes:
"relevant factors may be termed 'policy or proximity,' but the adoption of a different filing system
does not alter the content of those files," supra note 7 at 60.
89. Manderson, supra note 46 at 105. "The concept of policy considerations limits responsibility
by reference to we, the sociopathic grammar. It imports the social outcome of legal judgments as
a relevant constraining factor... [But] proximity and policy.. .are concerned with quite distinct
relationships. Proximity orients responsibility by reference to you; policy by reference to us, in terms
of society's interests as a whole" at 104-105.
90. Weinrib, "The Disintegration of Duty", supra note 7 at 145.
91. As Allan Beever writes of the UK context: "The presence of policy arguments in legal analysis
is symptomatic of the failure of our general accounts of the law. The frequent appeal to policy is
symptomatic of a system in crisis. The law of negligence is a system in crisis": "Policy in Private Law:
An Admission of Failure" (2006) 25:2 The Queensland Law Journal 287 and Rediscovering the Law
ofNegligence (London: Hart Publishing, 2007).
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for an analysis of category and policy justifications, if observed through
the Cooper lens. Indeed, the need to follow the Anns structure, already
discarded by the House of Lords, comes starkly into question. The Court
in Cooper grasps the need to follow past case law and claims to have
"repeatedly expressed"92 the view that policy belongs at both stages of the
Anns inquiry. And yet, previous jurisprudence had not explicitly inserted
policy considerations into stage one of the Anns inquiry and had instead
affirmed that policy considerations arise on the second stage to trump a
primafacie duty of care."
History is thus subject to constant revisiting and questioning in the
common law; the "holding" of a case is never quite fixed in time. Against
this context we can better appreciate the error identified in Part I as one
of precedent or of remembering. When the Supreme Court forgets its
own history, and, in particular, Winnipeg Condominium, one of its own
principal unanimous cases relevant to the development of the duty of care
for pure economic loss, then it forces others to rewrite the lines that tie past
to present to future. It forgets to build on what has come before and instead
replaces or rewrites, leaving us to speculate as to how well it understands
where it has been and where it is going.
Ill. Responsible participation:the rules of conversation
In Part I, we identified four errors committed by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Cooper: errors in the placement of words, the naming of
judges, the identification of structure, and the remembering of precedent.
In Part 1I, we retold the story of duty of care in the tort of negligence
with Cooper as a point on a timeline stretching back to Donoghue and
forward to the present. In selecting and emphasizing certain aspects of
that story, we attempted to fill out the four themes of words, judges,
structure, and precedent, and the corresponding four characteristic
features of common law methodology and development: placing, naming,
identifying, and remembering. In the third and final part of this paper, we
reflect on responsible participation in the common law. We argue that the
importance of words, names, structure, and history of the common law can
be best understood by reference to an idea of "conversation." Engaging in
conversation may indeed be "academic," as the Supreme Court of Canada

92. Cooper, supra note I at 28.
93. The SCC's approach in cases preceding Cooper meant that prima facie duties of care were
recognized in circumstances where they may not have been under Cooper's reformulation of Anns: see
for instance Norsk, supra note 18 per Stevenson J; London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International
Ltd, [19921 3 SCR 299, per La Forest J and Hercules, supra note 9. This point is also made by Russell
Brown, supra note 67 at 183, note 103.

"Academic Concerns"--Caring about Conversation in
Canadian Common Law

429

suggests, but it is also crucial to responsible participation as advocates,
judges, and readers of the common law. That is, instead of worrying about
and characterizing as "beside the point" the admittedly slippery discussion
of duty of care, we can acknowledge and nourish its "academic" nature as
central to common law methodology itself.
Viewing the common law as a conversation gives us a metaphor with
which to explore and define its unique characteristics, constraints, and
contours. The constantly shifting, and yet undeniably shaping, nature of
the common law can be captured by many possible images and metaphors.
From a chain novel to a family recipe recopied and modified through
generations, from an unfinished symphony to a pointillist painting, from
an everlasting gobstopper to blues improvisation, concrete pictures can
both inspire and ground our understanding of common law method and
form. 94 Here, we offer conversation as a particularly helpful and significant
structure that provides a way both to take part in, and maintain a critical
perspective on, common law development. We then underscore, in turn,
the "rules" of conversation that mean that words, names, structure, and
history all matter in the creation and maintenance of the conversation
itself.
A conversation is commonly defined as an exchange of words
between or among speakers, which takes place on the basis of a common
language and shared understanding or commitment. But the meaning of
the Latin root of "conversation" went beyond the purely verbal, invoking
dealings with others and one's manner of conducting oneself in the
world: conversationem (nom conversatio)meant the "act of living with,"
from the verb conversari which meant "to live with or keep company
with."" A conversation, then, was a social relationship before it was a
verbal interaction. The relational dimension of this original wider sense
of conversation grounds its potential as an activity grounded in social
interaction, ethical behaviour, and responsibility to others.

94. These are all suggestions made by second year law students in Advanced Common Law
Obligations at McGill University in response to the challenge of finding metaphors for, or images of,
common law drawn from music, art, literature, or cuisine. The idea of a line of precedent as a "chain
novel" is explored in Ronald Dworkin, Law s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986)
228-238.
95. L. conversationem (nom. conversatio) "act of living with," prp. of conversari "to live with, keep
company with," lit. "turn about with," from L. com- intens. prefix + vertare, freq. of vertere. The Latinbased word moved from designating social intercourse in general to a more specific verbal sense. The
Greek-based synonym "dialogue" (from O.Fr. dialoge, from L. dialogus, from Gk. dialogos, related
to dialogesthai "converse," from dia- "across" + legein "speak") arose a different way, its sense being
broadened from a literary work consisting of a conversation between two or more people (c 1225) to
a conversation.itself (c 1401).

430 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Linguistic philosopher HP Grice viewed conversation as a "cooperative
effort," governed by what he called the "cooperative principle":
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of
disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or
set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.... We might
then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be
expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage by which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose of direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. One might label this the cooperative principle."6
We can perceive that Grice's cooperative principle is both
descriptive-a kind of precondition for actually having a conversationas well as prescriptive-a normative ideal by which participants in that
conversation are encouraged to moderate and shape their utterances.
The metaphor of conversation has been used before to describe
certain features of law and legal reasoning." But law is a particular kind
of conversation, given that it is a product of institutional power and

96. HP Grice, "Logic and Conversation" in Peter Cole & Jerry L Morgan, eds, Syntax and Semantics,
vol 3 (New York: Academic Press, 1975) 41 at 45. Grice analyzed this cooperation as involving four
maxims: quantity, where speakers give enough and not too much information; quality, by which
speakers are genuine and sincere, speaking truth or facts; relation, by which utterances are relevant to
the context of the speech; and manner, by which speakers try to present meaning clearly and concisely,
avoiding ambiguity.
97. Joseph W Singer referred to "legal reasoning" as a "conversation" when defending critical
legal studies against the charge of indeterminacy: "Legal reasoning is not an accurate representation
of an innate antecedently existing decision procedure of rational consensus that unites all persons
involved in legal discourse. Traditional legal theorists assume that if legal reasoning is neither
accurate representation nor an intersubjective decision procedure, then we are left intolerably free
to say anything.... This fear is not surprising. Conversations are often free-wheeling. They can take
unexpected and dangerous turns." Joseph W Singer, "The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory" (1984) 94 Yale LJ I at 51. For an understanding of law and legal writing as conversation, see
Teresa G Phelps, "The New Legal Rhetoric" (1986) 40 Sw LJ 1089, 1102; for rights as conversation,
see Elizabeth M Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's
Movement" (1986) 61 NYU Law Review 589 at 622. Many scholars point out that a good metaphor
opens up multiple possibilities of re-understanding, while a bad metaphor confines discourse within
its own limited terms. See Douglas Berggren, "The Use and Abuse of Metaphor 1" (1962) Rev
Metaphysics 237 at 244-245. Justice Benjamin Cardozo was sensitive to the use of metaphors in
legal reasoning, warning that they had "to be narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it": Berkey v ThirdAve Ry Co (1926), 155 NE 58 at 61; see also
Lord Mansfield's observation that "nothing in law is so apt to mislead than a metaphor," cited in
Thomas Ross, "Metaphor and Paradox" (1989) 23 Ga L Rev 1053 at 1053, see also 1055-1056.
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authority.98 In Austinian terms, the speech act of a judge is performative,
instantiating the force of law it claims to be drawing upon.99 While its
written form allows it to span centuries and continents, engaging past
and present voices in a back and forth dialogue, the common law is
dominated by the motif of the speaking person and the singular judicial
voice. oo Indeed, appellate judgments are often written as if read aloud in a
0 Unique
courtroom, in the presence of adversaries and interested parties.o'
among the world's major legal traditions, the common law practice of
rendering multiple judgments in appellate decisions means each decision
must be grasped as an exchange among distinct voices. The common law
is multivocal and dialogic even in its most authoritative form.
Adopting the "aural" 02 metaphor of a conversation, with its
emphasis on the speaking voice, allows us to sidestep visual formats for
understanding the common law. Attempts to render the common law in
terms of a map of legal principles "thought to have no uniquely correct
verbal form" 03 are products of a sometimes overpowering or hegemonic
appeal to visualisation. In contrast, as Karl Llewellyn wrote, the principles
of the common law cannot be disembodied from those responsible for
articulating them and then later referring to, and necessarily modifying,
them:
The phrasing of the court, the points that it picks out for stress, the
patience and impatience displayed in dealing with cases cited and with
contentions of counsel, the interest or lack of interest shown (on the level
of evidence-interpretation) in what the parties seem really to have had
in mind, the bluntness or the delicacy of the legal tools with which the
court has reasoned-these lay the foundation for a prediction as to how
the court in a later case will respond. 0

98. Charles Fried reminds us that "the judicial opinion is unique in the world of political discourses:
it is an authoritative explanation": Charles Fried, "Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power" (2000)
23:3 Harvard JL and PP 807 at 828. Some other generic features ofjudgments are discussed in Robert
A Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre" (1990) 2 Yale J L & Hum 201; and John
Leubsdorf, "The Structure of Judicial Opinions" (2001) 86 Minn LR 447.
99. John L Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford Uni Press, 1975).
100. Mikhail M Bakhtin commented that "the enormous significance of the motif of the speaking
person is obvious in the realm of ethical and legal thought and discourse": The DialogicImagination:
Four Essays by MM Bakhtin, ed by Michael Holquist, translated by Caryl Emerson & Michael
Holquist (Austin: Uni of Texas Press, 2004 [1981]) at 249.
101. Lord Goff, in "The Future of the Common Law" (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 745, remarks on the common law's "essentially oral procedure" at 759.
102. Bernard J Hibbits, "Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality and the Reconfiguration of
American Legal Discourse" (1994) 16 Cardozo Law Review 241.
103. AWB Simpson, An Invitation to Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) at 7.
104. Karl N Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (New York: Oceana
Publications, 1951) at 67-68.
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In allowing us to talk about speakers, voices, listeners, and dialogue,
the idea of conversation helps to contextualize the partial nature of
any particular moment in the common law, to see how each speaker is
responding to someone else, and that their words are always liable to
adaptation and re-use. Conversation demands respect for other participants
in it; there are limits and constraints on how one voice is able to dominate
and even bring an end, temporarily, to the conversation on a particular
topic. Understanding judges as conversants highlights their obligation to
attend to what has come before, to position themselves within a continuing
tradition, and to remain open to what may lie ahead.
1. Why words matter: meaning and metaphor in conversation
Words shape and redirect conversation.'o As participants in a conversation,
we rely on words and their significance in whatever language or languages
we happen to be speaking. We select our words with some comprehension
of what they mean to us and what they will convey to others. Words are
the stuff of conversation, its basic elements or building blocks. In legal
judgments, a word can be the crucial nexus in relations of meaning
stretching back into the past and forward into the future. In the context of
the common law, and in particular that of the private law of obligations,
words define ways of talking about the limits of our responsibility to
others, and sometimes fall short of expressing what it is we really want
to say. 06
For example, judgments about "proximity" in negligence law can use
words such as "reliance," "expectation," and "vulnerability," developed
in the context of contract and fiduciary duty."' Each use of a word by
common law judges and commentators illuminates and is illuminated
by every other instance of its use. As demonstrated by Mikhail Bakhtin,
influential theorist of conversation, meaning does not rely on a pre-existing
set of differences between words, but on an ongoing diachronic production

105. "Legal language does not determine the outcome to legal disputes. Rather, it 'steers the mind
through the task at hand,' directing practitioners and thinkers in an ordered way towards various
factors and particular ways of presenting their arguments. The common law is, in short, a discourse
and not a machine...": Manderson, supra note 46 at 142.
106. "[T]he imperfection of a symbol is not a shortcoming but the other side of the work of abstraction
it performs": Hans George Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 2006 [1979]) at 346347.
107. See the language of "reasonable expectation" and "reasonable reliance" in Hercules and Lac
Minerals Ltd v InternationalCorona Resources Ltd, [ 1989] 2 SCR 574. The notions of reliance and
vulnerability in analyses of fiduciary duty could also have dominated negligence law if circumstances
had facilitated a more sustained development of Hedley Byrne-see for example Lord Goff in White v
Jones, [1995] 2 AC 207, who expanded the Hedley Byrne principle to include a duty of care owed by
a solicitor to a beneficiary of a negligently prepared will.
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of differences through use. Thus dialogue is inherent to the sense-making
capacity of language:
The word in living conversation is directly oriented towards a future
answering-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures
itself in the answer's direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the
already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which
has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the
answering word. Such is the situation in any living dialogue.' 8
Taken out of the context of the common law conversation of which it
forms a part, the Cooper court's characterization of Lord Atkin's principle
as the "negligence" principle rather than the "neighbour" principle may
not seem like a significant or noteworthy mistake. A small slip in language
does not, and should not, single-handedly determine the outcome of any
particular dispute. To dismiss this error as meaningless or irrelevant,
however, misses a crucial dimension of the inventive and interpretative
activity of judging. It misses the resonance of the "neighbour" word and
concept and principle. It avoids the legacy of the neighbour principle, its
echo through the case law that added layer upon layer to the meaning of
the judgment in which it was formulated. And it tries to dull the sharp
impact of the neighbour principle, to flatten the contours ofjudgments that
have wrestled with its promise and perils.
The sound of a conversation in which the word "neighbour" gets
repeated over and over-by different speakers with widely differing
attitudes and interpretations--doesn't lead inexorably to that word's
definition. But, if we want to participate in the quest for the meaning of
words like "neighbour" or "proximity" or "policy," then we pay attention
to how they are used by different participants in different contexts.109
Their "meaning" may exist primarily in the spaces between their mention.
But that doesn't mean that we can afford to be sloppy about words that
don't seem fixed. Instead, it invites us to consider how each and every use
of them will affect their meaning. For 'common law participants, as for
speakers in a conversation, words are all there is to work with, so we have
to get them right-especially when they shape a central idea like that of
the neighbour principle in negligence.

108. Bakhtin, supra note 100 at 280; see also Ludwig Wittgenstein, PhilosophicalInvestigations
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1968) ss 66-71.
109. Like any legal tradition, the common law "does not exist apart and in abstraction from those who
consider themselves participants in it and the words that they use": Rod Macdonald & Jason MacLean,
"No Toilets in Park" (2005) 50 McGill LJ 721 at 730.
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2. Why names matter: participantsin the conversation
As pointed out by Hans Gadamer, "The first condition of the art of
conversation is ensuring that the other person is with us."o10 That is, there
may be words (the "what" of conversation) but there must also be people
(the "who") speaking with, and listening to, each other. Two characteristics
of common law judging reflect the significance in conversation of
engaging the listener. First, common law judges are not one-time storytellers with no future speaking engagement in sight. Rather, they talk
with each other and listen as they speak. Any student of common law
appreciates that judges cannot simply create or innovate out of thin air;
perhaps most romantically put by Benjamin Cardozo, the judge is not a
"knight errant.""' The common law judge must draw on what has already
been said and must speak with a sense of responsibility and in a way meant
to persuade those who will speak in the future.
Second, judgments are always signed and attributed to the judges who
construct them. Most evident in multi-judgment decisions where each
judgment carries the name of its author-such that the case moves forward
with a necessarily plural meaning-this is a crucial characteristic of the
development of common law." 2 The distinctive voices of individual judges
are part of the sound and significance of the conversation surrounding any
given issue and its ongoing analysis. Responsibility for what is said rests
with the creator of the specific judgment. Thus, when the words of one
judge are attributed to another, the conversation breaks down. The listener
has stopped paying attention not only to what has been said, but by whom.
Studying the common law involves tracking the voices of individual
judges through different cases, and noting how they revisit and refine their
own past judgments. Studying the duty of care in the tort of negligence,
in particular, might include imagined conversations between Lord Atkin
and Lord Wilberforce, or between Lord MacMillan and Lord Diplock,
or between Justice McLachlin and Justice La Forest. It might require
heightened attention to the role in dynamic conversation of the dissenting
judge, whether Lord Buckmaster in Donoghue, Justice Laskin in Rivtow
Marine, or Justice La Forest in Norsk.' " And it might benefit from analysis
of the transatlantic "conversation" between the Supreme Court of Canada

110. Gadamer, supra note 106 at 360.
Ill. Benjamin Cardozo, "The Judge as a Legislator" in The Nature of the Judicial Process (New
Haven: Yale Univ Press, 1921) 98 at 141.
112. Lord Goff, supra note 101.
113. Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?" (2000) 38 Osgoode
Hall LJ 495. See Lord Goff, supra note 101 at 755-756 (commenting on the centrality of dissent in the
common law as opposed to the civil law).
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and the House of Lords in post-Anns jurisprudence as an engagement
between different positions on judicial responsibility for policy.
It is in this context that we might express concern over the Supreme
Court of Canada's confusion between Lord Atkin and Lord MacMillan.
This is a mistake that seems to express disregard for the matching of
individual participant to specific idea. And, if the importance of taking
responsibility for one's own words disappears from the very construction
of common law, then we risk losing the constraints that ensure its shape
and solidity. That is, through reference to other fellow speakers in the
conversation, common law judges operate within a framework meant to
underscore responsibility-responsibility to the past, and responsibility
for the future. In Cooper, the seven judges who sign on to the judgment
must all accept responsibility for the error in naming their predecessors
and situating their contributions.
Judges are the primary participants in the common law conversation,
but they are not the only voices. While the traditional sources of the
common law are past cases, academic commentators play a significant
role in judicial decision-making and thinking about a particular case, as
evidenced in Bruce Feldthusen's analysis of pure economic loss being
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada and providing the organizing
framework for all negligence actions in that field." 4 There is always
potential for the dynamics of the conversation to disrupt the hierarchy
of judicial authority, as an academic commentary or a clerk's ingenuity
finds its way into the common law. As writers, teachers, students, and
practitioners, we each have a responsibility to develop the common law in
an appropriate methodological way. All of us are participants, which means
that none of us are the primary or definitive storytellers or authorities,
but have to continue talking with each other and listening carefully as we
speak.
3. Why structure/spacematters:fixed points in the conversation
The description of any conversation goes beyond reference to its words
and its speakers. To capture the essence of an ongoing conversation, we
pay attention to "how" it proceeds, develops, plays itself out. There are
rules and structures: questions-unless rhetorical-demand response;
exclamations provide emphasis; new directions are marked out in specific
ways; certain tools exist for bringing the conversation to an end, at least
temporarily. One speaker's contribution to the conversation becomes a

114. See note 71.
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starting point for elaboration or modification or variation provided by the
next speaker in time: "[s]uch is the situation in any living dialogue.""'
As participants in common law, we know that we learn more by
looking at how a judgment is structured and developed than by noting who
won the case. Just as is required in following a conversation, we delve into
the complexity of the common law not by looking for the final answer but
by paying attention to the ways in which the questions are asked and the
responses are shaped. In this sense, a judge is required to answer the issue
at hand and the determination for the particular parties in the case will
thus be fixed. But that answer also becomes a contribution to the ongoing
conversation, a point subject to dislocation. By necessity, then, there exists
no settled way to transcribe or represent or determine for all time what the
answer is.
It is in this context that responsibility in articulating the question
becomes significant and, for these reasons, that the Supreme Court in
Cooper commits an error when it frames the issue of duty of care as one of
foreseeability of damage. The question asked should provide direction and
structure for the potentially complex discussion that follows. The wrong
question means that participants in the conversation lose track of what
they have agreed to talk about. Thus, when the Court suggests that the
first stage of the test for duty of care in negligence is whether the harm
that occurs is the foreseeable consequence of the wrongdoer's behaviour,
then the conversation shifts course. No longer do its participants focus on
the relationship between wrongdoer and victim, and it becomes difficult to
understand how the answer to a proximate cause inquiry provides direction
to the submerged question of duty of care.
Misstating the precise question need not derail the conversation. Its
participants can modify the words the next time around, and dissection
of the conversation might reveal the error to be a mere instance of
misspeaking rather than misunderstanding. But the Cooper court not only
gets the question wrong, but-as illustrated by its approach to answering
it-also gets wrong the very structure of the conversation and the common
law it symbolizes. In unison it purports to repair all past complexity and
to avoid any future confusion over the duty of care inquiry. It is rare for a
judgment to hold itself out as a "fixed point,""'6 as a definitive guide and
standard for future courts. The Cooper court does just that.

115. Bakhtin, supra note 100 at 280.
116. Sunstein, supra note 26 at 771.
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Sure enough, the decision is now a touchstone for Canadian courts
deciding duty of care." Its reformulation of the Anns test is referred to as
a new rule: the "Cooper/Anns test,""' suggesting that the decision renders
unnecessary any renewed inquiry into Anns itself and its admittedly messy
legacy. The Cooper/Anns test is unabashedly offered as a way to make
the judicial function easier, to leave to "academic" circles any ongoing
discussion of proximity and relationship in the tort of negligence, and
to restrict analysis to recognition of fixed categories and explication of
relevant policy considerations. And yet, the fact that Cooper announces
itself as a voice that erases part of the past conversation doesn't mean
that it succeeds in doing so. The appeal to policy doesn't mean that past
struggles to delineate the scope of responsibility in the tort of negligence
lose their resonance, nor that future struggles disappear." 9
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing extra-curially, has suggested that
the Supreme Court of Canada's post-Anns cases on tort recovery for
pure economic loss reflected "a see-saw competition"' 20 between two
approaches she labels universal and formalist. McLachlin describes her
judgment in Norsk as "a case-by-case enunciation of how the universal
principle applies" 2 ' and her later "flexible categories" notion as a way
to reconcile any conflict between universalism and formalism.'2 2 The
combination of category and policy offered by Cooper is presented as a
way to stop the "see-saw," a way to hold the process of inquiry in perpetual
equilibrium, a way to simplify reasoning and decision-making. And yet,
the notion of categories does not do away with principled analysis; as
Stephen Perry explains, "categories of cases are, after all, defined by
principles stated at one or another level of generality." 23 And choosing a
category for any given case requires normative judgment and, as Desmond
117. Cooper has been referred to in every Supreme Court case dealing with duty of care since 2001:
see cases cited at supra note 5. Provincial Courts of Appeal also continue to negotiate the Cooper
restatement of Anns: for recent examples, see Jones v Donaghey, 2010 BCSC 1498 at paras 32-39;
Williams v Ontario,2009 ONCA 378 at paras 12-36.
118. See for instance Eliopoulos, supra note 85 at 9; Donaldson v John Doe et al, 2007 BCSC 557
at 48; and Michael Bodner, "Odhavji Decision: Old Ghosts and New Confusion in Canadian Courts"
(2004-5) 42 Atla L Review 1061 at 1082.
119. Cass Sunstein argues that analogical reasoning facilitates practical outcomes without the
need for the judges to agree on a comprehensive theory that accounts for that outcome. "Within the
legal culture, analogical reasoning imposes a certain discipline, and a widespread moral or political
consensus is therefore unnecessary": Sunstein, supranote 26 at 770.
120. Beverley McLachlin, "Evolution of the Law of Private Obligation: The Influence of Justice
La Forest" in R Johnson et al, eds, Gerald V La Forest at the Supreme Courtof Canada, 1985-1997
(Winnipeg: Canadian Legal History Project, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, 2000) at 38.
121. Ibid at 39.
122. [bid at 42.
123. Perry, supra note 42 at 252.
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Manderson underlines, is the precise choice with which reference to the
past does not assist.124 The process of characterizing facts and articulating
relevant considerations 2 5 -or, in Cooper terms, of selecting categories
and inserting policy-continues to shape and depend upon ongoing
conversation.' 26 Not even the Cooper court, despite assertion to the
contrary, can circumvent that process.
4. Why history matters:from past to future through conversation
The fourth and final error in Cooper is one of memory. Participants in
a meaningful conversation situate themselves each time they make a
contribution. They refer to what has come before; they indicate that they
have been listening to their counterparts or that they are conscious of what
they have already said. Speakers are not necessarily bound to consistency,
but they are generally expected to indicate awareness of where the
conversation has come from and where their contributions fit. In common
law too, participation in the form ofjudgment requires repeated accounting
for where it comes from and where it belongs. When the Cooper court
excludes one of its own unanimous judgments of the past, it overlooks
its institutional identity and its responsibility for paying attention to the
development of the conversation to which it contributes.
As students of the common law, we understand and analyze cases by
looking at what they build on and predicting their later impact. At times,
as Karl Llewellyn graphically suggested, a common law judge offers a
judgment that, like a "knife," "cuts the past away."' 2 7 The importance of
precedent in common law methodology does not mean that changewhether incremental or abrupt-is not possible. But it does mean that the
past cannot be ignored. The voices of past participants do not disappear
even if they lack the power to somehow freeze the conversation. Even more
obviously, acknowledging one's own contributions as a speaker in the past
is crucial to persuading others of a change in direction or of modified
interpretation. In particular, confronting past contributions, when one is no
124. "A judge trying to decide whether the current dispute fits within established categories must
always confront the fact that they have a choice: we must still decide if this case is 'the same as' or
'different from' the past, and-obvious or difficult-this is one choice that the past cannot ever help
us with," in Desmond Manderson, "Two Turns of the Screw: The Hart-Fuller Debate" in Peter Cane,
ed, The Hart-FullerDebate: 50 Years On (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 197 at 208.
125. Geoffrey Samuels describes the process of drawing an analogy between two facts as "a matter of
image (non-symbolic knowledge) rather than proposition": Samuels, supranote 52 at 176.
126. Cardozo described judging as the selection and presentation of facts, and the framing of issues,
"so as to produce a cumulative and mass effect" which reinforces the "rightness" or "justice" of the
decision, in Selected Writings of Benjamin Cardozo, Margaret E Hall, ed, (Albany: M Bender, 1980)
at 352.
127. Llewellyn, supra note 104 at 68.
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longer confident as to their correctness, is crucial to inspiring trust among
fellow speakers.
The judgment in Cooper begins by revisiting the history and
development of recovery for negligently caused pure economic loss from
Donoghue on. In the course of sketching that history, and the ongoing
quest to clarify the test for establishing a duty of care, the Court omits
Winnipeg Condominium and its own strong approval of recovery in that
case's situation of dangerously defective premises. In a judgment based
on negligence law's principled preoccupation with, and responsiveness
to, personal injury, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada had moved
situations of dangerous buildings into a recognized category of recovery
for pure economic loss. By Cooper, perhaps the Supreme Court of Canada
would have offered a different answer to the issue of duty of care in
Winnipeg Condo, but by simply ignoring its own past, the Court fails to
paint the full picture of where it comes from as it offers a new way to
determine duty of care. It fails to take full responsibility as a reliable and
persuasive speaker in the conversation.
The substantive impact or significance of this incomplete fitting
together of past jurisprudence with the policy-heavy Cooper test is
difficult to assess. But the answer to why the omission of a particular
reference matters doesn't lie in substantive analysis of the judgment.
Instead, the error matters because, as a participant in the development of
the common law, the Supreme Court should be counted on to know at least
its own history. The very notion of precedent demands that we continually
acknowledge and work over the "knotty problem of the past... [build]
knots upon knots, imperfections upon imperfections." 28 As evocatively
stated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the common law judge "must be a
historian and prophet all in one. "129 As historian, the judge in common law
mode looks backwards, retracing the story and highlighting those parts
of history to be brought to bear on the current decision. As prophet, the
judge constantly looks to the future, aware of the impossibility of fixing
the way in which the judgment at hand will be understood, interpreted,
and applied. 3 0 When the judge-as a participant in the conversation of
128. "Precedent remembers and continues to worry over that knotty problem of the past. It builds
knots upon knots, imperfections upon imperfections. Certainly the High Court, faced with such
interruptions in its supposedly seamless thread of rules, will always attempt to gather up the loose ends
and retie the thread over and over again. That is how our institutions work. But the knots thus formed
conserve the memory of that disruption and authorize the possibility of new ones to further unsettle a
purely internal and conceptual system of order": Manderson, supra note 46 at 198.
129. Benjamin Cardozo, "The Game of Law and its Prizes" in Law and Literatureand Other Essays
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931) at 166.
130. Llewellyn, supra note 104.
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common law-appears to get history wrong, then the direction set for the
future might not be right either.
The Cooper court's approach to the future, echoing that to the past,
signifies a particularly problematic disregard for the conventions of
conversation. The judgment in Cooper purports to tie up all the loose ends.
It attempts to articulate, with a definitive tone, a test that will need no
further revisiting or revision. But this derails the ongoing conversation and
fails to sustain the very shape of the common law. The complex, necessarily
dense back-and-forth embedded in past jurisprudence and analysis of the
tort of negligence is dismissed as "academic": unnecessarily difficult to
understand and engage in, and perhaps even pointless. In contrast, the
Court promises that post-Cooper negligence law will be straightforward,
transparent, and pared down. The promise may feel attractive, perhaps
particularly for students of common law conversation who find it
difficult and exhausting to look backward in order to move forward, but
it is a necessarily empty promise.' No common law court truly ends the
conversation; no judgment unilaterally replaces ongoing discussion with
the final word.
Conclusion: academic concerns
Academic analysis of law in general, and of a Supreme Court judgment
in particular, can take many forms. Varieties of social critique assess
context and consequences; a historical focus situates sources of law and
elaborates on their setting in time apd space; the literary elegance of a
judgment might be the subject of attention; alternatively, the discussion
might consist of a dissection of substantive consistency with related
sources. In this essay, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Cooper
has inspired a methodological commentary in the form of reflections on
conversation as a metaphor for common law. Through the errors it includes
and its attempt to distance "academic" discussion from its central task, the
Cooperjudgment provides a rich backdrop for identifying and appreciating
principal features of common law methodology and the conversation to
which participants commit.
The rules of conversation that we have highlighted in this paper
are prescriptive: use words carefully, get names right, pay attention to
structure, remember what has already been said. These are guiding norms

131. In his critique of this kind of approach, Cass Sunstein contrasts the hubris of Ronald Dworkin's
ideal judge Hercules, who seeks a principle and an interpretation of that principle which will be right
for now and forever, with the humility of a real (and model) judge, Justice Harlan, who assiduously
works and reworks the threads of the past. Sunstein, supra note 26 at 783-787.
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in the common law tradition.'32 They describe the language and methods
of common law reasoning, and provide the signposts for understanding
and developing the law. A speaker in a meaningful conversation chooses
words carefully, identifies other speakers, respects procedural parameters,
and listens carefully to what has been said. So too do participantswhether judges or advocates, teachers or students-in the common law.
Sometimes the weight of following the rules of common law conversation
feels oppressive,' but this is the only way to grasp the contours of the
common law, to engage in a multi-dimensional mapping of its movement,
to appreciate its normative dimensions. Participants, including judges, stay
on-track by keeping sight of these signposts. When mistakes are madewith respect to words, names, structure, or memory-the conversation
falters and the speakers lose their way.
This paper is "academic"-perhaps in the very way the Court meant
the term. It does not aim to clarify the test for establishing duty of care in
the tort of negligence, although it does suggest that the combination of
category and policy may not provide the certainty the Court intends. It does
not comment on the rightness or wrongness of the conclusion regarding
recovery for pure economic loss in Cooper, nor does it trace the precise
ways in which Cooper has been incorporated and modified in the years
since it was decided. Instead, it underlines the need to pay attention to the
back-and-forth, ups and downs, this way and that way, that characterize
the case law that precedes Cooper. It provokes the reader to revisit the
importance of principle and precedent as organizing structures in the
common law generally and in the tort of negligence more specifically. 34
It suggests that mistakes about and disdain for the past, render necessarily
suspect the significance for the future of any common law judgment.
The Supreme Court, like any speaker in common law, is invited
to participate in a multi-faceted conversation. But enjoyment of the
conversation itself-in all its "academic" glory-is the prerequisite to full
132. For a discussion of the common law traditions and the features of its methodology, in comparative
perspective, see H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions ofthe World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 2d ed,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 222-270.
133. Cardozo describes common law judging in the following way: "[I]t is the masters, and no
others, who feel sure enough of themselves to omit the intermediate steps and stages, and leap to the
conclusion. Most of us are so uncertain of our strength, so beset with doubts and difficulties, that we
feel oppressed with the need of justifying every holding by analogies and precedents and an exposure
of the reasons": Benjamin Cardozo, "Law and Literature" (1939) 52:3 Harvard Law Review 471
at 478. While he himself might qualify as a "master," he captures the general responsibility of the
common law judge.
134. In the distinction he provocatively and confidently draws between activist and dynamic lawmaking, Lord Devlin insists that creativity is not an element of responsible common law judging: Lord
Devlin, "Judges and Lawmakers" (1976) 30 Modem Law Review 1.
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and meaningful participation. That enjoyment comes through welcoming,
and engaging in, the "academic" enterprise of paying attention to the
meaning of words, the names of judges, the structure of questions, and
the importance of the past. In this sense, the common law is a scholarly
enterprise, and the discussion dismissed in Cooperas "academic" is central
to its functioning, development, and health. Common law participants,
including courts and judges, are by definition caught in a constant process
of reading, learning, reflecting, testing, and shifting direction. Nothing that
is said or done in the common law is lost and nothing is final; everything
is part of an ongoing conversation that both precedes and outlives what
we have to say. "Academic" concerns, then, are the very core of common
law. Rejoicing in, rather than marginalizing, the "academic," fosters and
sustains common law conversation and all of the contributions that make
it meaningful.

